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CASENOTES

An Analysis of In re Piper Aircraft
Corporation
In In re PiperAircraft Corp.,1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
determined when future claimants hold claims within the meaning of
section 101(5) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy
Code"). 2 Piper Aircraft Corporation' filed for bankruptcy and attempted to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.4 Because
many Piper aircraft were operational at the time of the filing,' it was
1. 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995).
2. Id. at 1573. The Bankruptcy Code defines "claim" as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach
of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1978). Determining when a claim arises is important because only
holders of claims (and equity interests) are entitled to participate in distributions made
under a confirmed Chapter 11 reorganization plan.
3. Piper Aircraft Corporation designs, manufactures, and sells general aviation aircraft
and associated spare parts.
4. 58 F.3d at 1575.
5. Approximately 50,000 to 60,000 Piper Aircraft are still operational in the United
States. Id.
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a statistical certainty that individuals would be injured in accidents
after confirmation of the reorganization plan, but arising out of or
relating to products manufactured, sold, designed, or distributed by
Piper prior to confirmation." The bankruptcy court appointed a Legal
Representative to protect the interests of these future claimants7 in the
Piper case.' The Legal Representative filed a proof of claim on behalf
of the future claimants in an amount exceeding one-hundred million
dollars.9 The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and Piper
objected to the claim on grounds that the future claimants did not hold
claims within the meaning of section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.'0
The bankruptcy court held that future claimants did not hold claims
because there was no prepetition exposure to specific identifiable
defective products and because there was no prepetition relationship
between the debtor and the broadly defined class of future claimants."
The Legal Representative appealed. The district court affirmed, holding
that future claimants did not have claims absent some prepetition
exposure to a defective product. 2 The Legal Representative appealed
to the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding but formulated a new test to determine when future
claimants hold claims."3 The court held that a claim is established only
when (1) there is a preconfirmation relationship between an identifiable
claimant and the debtor, and (2) the basis for the liability arises out of
the debtor's prepetition conduct. 4

6. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 621 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
7. The court defined the class of future claimants to include:
All persons, whether known or unknown, born or unborn, who may, after the date
of confirmation of Pipers Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, assert a claim or
claims for personal injury, property damages, wrongful death, damages,
contribution and/or indemnification, based in whole or in part upon events
occurring or arising after the Confirmation Date, including claims based on the
law of product liability, against Piper or its successor arising out of or relating to
aircraft or parts manufactured and sold, designed, distributed or supported by
Piper prior to the Confirmation Date.
Id. at 621.
8. 58 F.3d at 1575.
9. Id. The claim was based on statistical assumptions regarding the number of
persons likely to suffer, after the confirmation of a reorganization plan, personal injury or
property damage caused by Piper's pre-confirmation manufacture, sale, design, distribution,
or support of aircraft and spare parts. Id.
10. Id.
11. 162 B.R. at 627.
12. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 168 B.R. 434, 439 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
13. 58 F.3d at 1577. This new test is known as the "PiperTest."
14. Specifically, the court held:.
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When Congress promulgated section 101(5), it intended to define
"claim" more broadly than the term was defined under prior bankruptcy
law.1" The former Bankruptcy Act of 1898 defined "claim" very
narrowly. Under the Act, a claim had to be both "proved" and "allowed"
to be treated under and bound by a reorganization plan. 6 Because of
this narrow definition, a debtor was prevented from treating in its plan
certain contingent claims that were not "provable" at the time of
reorganization. This limitation allowed such claims to be asserted
against a reorganized debtor."7 Two consequences of this narrow
definition of "claim" contravened established bankruptcy policy: first, it
allowed similarly situated creditors to be treated differently, and second,
it often led to the failure of the reorganization process."' The legislative history of section 101(5) reflects Congressional intent in revising the
definition of claim: "By this broadest possible definition ... this bill
contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how
remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy
case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court.""
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, virtually all courts have
agreed that the definition of claim should be an expansive one.2" What
has not been agreed upon is how far this definition should be expanded. 2 ' Three important theories have emerged to help answer this
question: the Accrued State Law Claim Test, the Conduct Test, and the
Prepetition Relationship Test. The Accrued State Law Claim Test, the
narrowest interpretation of claim, provides that there is no claim for
bankruptcy purposes until a cause of action has accrued under state

An individual has a § 101(5) claim against a debtor manufacturer if (i) events
occurring before confirmation create a relationship, such as contact, exposure,
impact or privity between the claimant and the debtor's product; and (ii) the basis
for the liability is the debtor's prepetition conduct in designing, manufacturing and
selling the allegedly defective or dangerous product. The debtor's prepetition
conduct gives rise to a claim to be administered in a case only if there is a
relationship established before confirmation between an identifiable claimant or
group of claimants and that prepetition conduct.
Id. at 1577.
15. 162 B.R. at 622.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. H.R. Rep. No. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5963, 6266.
20. 162 B.R. at 623 (citing In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985)); see also In re St.
Laurent, 991 F.2d 672 (11th Cir. 1993).
21. 162 B.R. at 623.
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law.2 In In re Frenville," the Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the Accrued State Law Claim Test and held that an indemnification
claim against' the debtor arising after the petition date was not a claim
under section 101(5).24

The issue before the court was whether the

automatic stay provision of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 25
applied when the debtor's acts forming the basis of the suit occurred
prepetition but the actual cause of action could not be asserted until
postpetition.26 Under New York law, a suit for indemnification could
be commenced only at or after the time the party seeking relief serves
an answer.2 7 Because the suit for which the party was seeking relief
was filed fourteen months after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the
court found there was no prepetition claim subject to the automatic
stay.28 The court found that the automatic stay provision was not
applicable because the "claim" for indemnification could not have been
commenced before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.29 Additionally,
the court found the party had not met the requirement that one have a
"right to payment"30 necessary to sustain a claim under the Code.3"
According to New York law, a right to payment does not arise in a claim
for indemnification until the party seeking indemnification has made the
payment for which it seeks relief.3 2 The court found its holding was in
keeping with Congressional policy that only those claims that arise
prepetition can be discharged." However, Frenville and its progeny
have been criticized as ignoring the intent of Congress to define claims
broadly in the bankruptcy context.' State law and federal nonbank-

22.

Id. at 624.

23. 744 F.2d 332, 332 (3d Cir. 1984).
24.
25.

Id. at 338.
The automatic stay provision provides that:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
sections 301, 302, or 303 of this title . .. operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities, of (1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against
the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of
the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1978).
26. 744 F.3d at 333.
27. Id. at 335.
28. Id. at 335-36.
29. Id. at 334.
30. See supra note 2 (providing the definition of claim according to U.S.C. § 101(5)).
31. 744 F.2d at 336.
32. Id. at 337.
33. Id. at 337-38.
34. 162 B.R. at 624.
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ruptcy law do not override the bankruptcy policies of an equitable
distribution to creditors and a fresh start to the debtor.35 For these
reasons, all courts outside the Third Circuit that have considered the
Accrued State Law Claim Test have rejected it.' Courts have been
more receptive to the Conduct Test, although some courts have found
this test provides too broad of a scope in some situations. 7 Under this
test, a right to payment arises when the conduct giving rise to the
alleged liability occurs.3" The leading case describing and adopting the
Conduct Test is In re A.H. Robins Co. 39 In this case, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered when a claim based upon the prepetition
insertion of a Dalkon Shield4" arises if the claimant's injury is not
manifested until postpetition. 4' The court explained that if the claim
arose upon insertion of the device, it would be considered a claim under
the Bankruptcy Code, and its prosecution would be stayed.4' But if the
claim arose when injury became apparent, it could not be a claim for
bankruptcy purposes, and the automatic stay would not apply.43 The
Fourth Circuit categorized the claim before it as "contingent"; that is, the
claim arose prepetition when the device was inserted, with the right to
payment contingent upon the manifestation of a future injury."
Because contingent claims are treatable in a reorganization plan, a claim
arising from prepetition insertion of a Dalkon Shield with injury
manifested postpetition would be dischargeable in the plan. The court
based its decision on: (1) a literal reading of the Code's definition of
claim, 4 (2) the Congressional intent that "claim" be given a broad
interpretation,4 and (3) the district court's equitable power to assure
the orderly conduct of the reorganization process. 47 The courts that
have concluded the Conduct Test defines claim too broadly have

35. Id.
36. Id. (citing In re A.H. Robins, 63 B.R. 986 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986); In re Edge, 60 B.R.
690 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Johns-Mansville Corp, 57 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986)).
37. Id. at 625.
38. Id. at 624.
39. 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988).
40. The Dalkon Shield is an intrauterine contraceptive device, the production of which
was discontinued in 1974 because of mounting concerns about its safety. Id. at 199.
41. Id.
42. Id. See supra note 25 (defining the "automatic stay" provision of the Bankruptcy
Code).
43. 839 F.2d 199.
44. Id at 202-03.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.

932

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

recognized claims only for those individuals with some type of established prepetition relationship with the debtor.4 These courts have
applied the Prepetition Relationship Test, which requires some
prepetition relationship such as contact, exposure, impact, or privity
between the debtor's prepetition conduct and the claimant. 49 In In re
Pettibone Corp.,' the debtor had been sued for injuries sustained by
the operator of a forklift that had been designed and manufactured
prepetition.5" The claimant was hired by his employer and had
sustained his injury postpetition; thus, the claimant had no prepetition
contact with either the debtor or the forklift.52 The Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Illinois found that because the claimant's
injury occurred postpetition without any prepetition relationship or
exposure to tie him to the debtor, there could be no claim as of the
petition date. 3 Because the injury could not be tied to some type of
prebankruptcy privity, contact, impact, or hidden harm, the claimant did
not hold a claim for bankruptcy purposes.54
In In re PiperAircraft Corp., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
summarily rejected the application of the Accrued State Law Claim Test
and agreed with the "majority of courts [that have rejected this test] as
imposing too narrow an interpretation of the term claim."5 5 The court
also rejected the Legal Representative's request that it apply the
Conduct Test and instead, chose to modify the Prepetition Relationship
Test used by the district court.' The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
district court's finding that the Conduct Test created too broad of a scope
for a claim. 7 It rejected the Conduct Test because the court believed

48. 58 F.3d at 1577 (citing In re Jenson, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Chateugay
Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991); In re CorrectMfg. Co., 167 B.R. 458 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1994)).
49. Id.
50. 90 B.R. 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
51. Id. at 919.
52. Id. at 920.
53. Id. at 932-33.
54. Id. at 931.
55. 58 F.3d at 1576 n.2 (citing In re A.. Robins, 839 F.2d 198; In re Black, 70 B.R. 645
(Bankr. D. Utah 1986); Acevedo v. Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co., 68 B.R. 495 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Johns-Manville
Corp., 57 B.R. 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Yanks, 49 B.R. 56 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985)).
56. Id. at 1577.
57. Id. The district court distinguished Piperfrom those cases in which courts found
claims arose when conduct giving rise to the alleged liability occurred. Each of those cases
involved (1) a wrongful prepetition act by the debtor, (2) a prepetition exposure or contact
with the defective product by the future claimant, and (3) an injury manifested postpetition
by the future claimant as a result of that prepetition conduct. 168 B.R. at 438. In applying
these factors to Piper, the district court noted there was no evidence in the record of a
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its application would enable anyone to hold a claim against Piper by
virtue of potential future exposure to any aircraft in the existing fleet.' 8
The court noted that even those cases that applied the Conduct Test
required some form of prepetition relationship." Although the definition of claim is to be interpreted broadly, the court refused to extend the
scope of a claim to include unidentified individuals with no discernible
prepetition relationship to Piper.' The Eleventh Circuit found the use
of the Prepetition Relationship Test to be more consistent with the
purposes and goals of the Bankruptcy Code than the Conduct Test.
However, it found the district court's use of the Prepetition Relationship
Test to be unnecessarily restrictive in mandating that the class of
claimants be limited to those who could be identified prior to the filing
of the petition.6 1 The court modified the Prepetition Relationship Test
to include those claimants with injuries occurring postpetition but
preconfirmation, provided that the injuries were caused by the debtor's
prepetition conduct.6 2 By changing the focal point of the analysis from
the petition date to the confirmation date, the Eleventh Circuit's Piper
Test now encompasses all claimants who can be identified preconfirmation. In the court's opinion, this change is consistent with the policies
underlying the Code.6 In applying this new Piper Test, the court
found that the future claimants failed to meet the minimum requirements necessary to hold a claim." There was no preconfirmation
exposure to a specific identifiable defective product nor was there any
other preconfirmation relationship between Piper and the broadly
defined class of future claimants." Because of this lack of preconfirmation connection between Piper and the future claimants, the court ruled
the future claimants did not have section 101(5) claims arising out of
Piper's prepetition design, manufacture, sale, and distribution of an
allegedly defective product.'

known defective or harmful product. Id. Secondly, there were some future claimants who
never had, and never will have, a prepetition exposure or contact with an allegedly
defective Piper product. Id. Finally, the court could not conceive of circumstances in which
prepetition exposure to allegedly defective Piper aircraft or parts would result in a
prepetition injury that did not manifest itself until postpetition. Id.
58. 58 F.3d at 1577.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1577 n.5.
64. Id. at 1588.
65. Id. See supra note 7 (providing the definition of "future claimant").
66. Id.
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The problem of how to treat "future" claims is one of the most vexing
issues in bankiuptcy67 While the Bankruptcy Code requires the
determination of when a claim arises, it does not address how that
determination should be made. The result is that the courts are left to
piece together formulations that inevitably evidence the conflict between
bankruptcy policy and practicality. The decision in Piperimplicates two
bankruptcy policies. The first policy implicated is the "fresh start"
policy. Defining claims broadly permits a "complete settlement of the
affairs of a bankrupt debtor and a complete discharge and fresh start"
by dealing with all of the legal obligations of the debtor." However,
the PiperTest enables contingent tort claims to survive the bankruptcy
and to be asserted against a reorganized debtor, which denies the debtor
the fresh start Congress intended. By adopting a modified version of the
Prepetition Relationship Test, the Eleventh Circuit has essentially
rewritten the Bankruptcy Code's concept of claim by eliminating the
words "contingent," "disputed," "unliquidated," and "unmatured" from
section 101(5) and adding the words "prepetition relationship" and
"preconfirmation injury."' The PiperTest limits the scope of a debtor's
obligations that can be settled in a bankruptcy case, thereby preventing
the debtor from receiving a complete discharge and a fresh start. A
reorganized debtor could emerge from bankruptcy only to be forced back
in because of surviving claims. However, the Eleventh Circuit, while
recognizing that "claim" was intended to be interpreted broadly, found
that even a broad definition has its limits. 70 The court stated the scope
of a claim cannot be extended to include unidentified and presently
unidentifiable individuals with no prepetition relationship to Piper.7
Apparently, the court concluded it was interpreting, rather than
rewriting, the Bankruptcy Code. A second bankruptcy policy implicated
by the decision in Piper is that similarly situated creditors should be
treated equally. Yet, under the Piper Test, victims injured by the
debtor's same prepetition acts will receive disparate treatment.7 2 Those
claimants injured by the debtor's prepetition acts who manifest injury
postconfirmation may be compensated in full, while those whose injuries
manifest themselves preconfirmation will be paid in "bankruptcy

67. Daniel L. Keaton, Getting A Handle on Late-Manifesting Claims: A Comment, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1095, 1095 (1994).
68. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977).

69.
70.
71.
72.
(1994).

See supra note 2.
58 F.3d at 1577.
Id.
Kathryn R. Heidt, The ChangingParadigmof Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1055, 1067
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dollars."73 This disparity is highlighted when one considers the same
situation in the case of a debtor that sells its assets, distributes the sales
proceeds to creditors, and then dissolves under state law. Application
of the PiperTest to those plaintiffs who are injured postconfirmation as
a result of the debtor's past acts will not allow them any recovery
These plaintiffs will be unable to recover in bankruptcy because they do
not hold claims. Further, they will be unable to recover in the future
because there will be no entity from which to recover.74 The Bankruptcy Court attempted to respond to this concern in its opinion.
In bankruptcy ... timing matters ....

[This] simple truth ... is

evident in numerous provisions of the Bankruptcy Code .... Creditor
Jones, paid in full 91 days before the petition may keep his money
while creditor Smith, paid the very next day, will have to disgorge the
entire amount and share in any distributions to unsecured creditors.
If timing was irrelevant, then Congress would have allowed the
Trustee to reach back indefinitely to recover all prepetition payments
made by insolvent debtors."

Thus, the Eleventh Circuit found closure to the bankruptcy process more
desirable than providing a fresh start to the debtor and equal treatment
to similarly situated creditors.
TARA ADYANTHAYA

73. Id.
74. Id. at 1068.
75. 162 B.R. at 628, 629 n.16.

